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Strategic Retreat: A Proposed Response to Evasive
Energy Company Tactics Following the Shale Boomand-Bust
I. INTRODUCTION: UNIQUE MARKET CONDITIONS AND
QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES
In 2006, there were enormous doubts about the viability of the
United States’ natural gas industry and its ability to adequately
supply domestic demand.1 However, new technologies and
discoveries resulted in a boom in the natural gas industry.2 Across
the country, natural gas companies like Chesapeake Energy
Corporation discovered deep formations of natural gas, called
shale.3 Large, state-spanning formations were discovered in
Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and the Appalachian
Basin.4 In Louisiana, a massive formation, the Haynesville Shale,
was discovered in the northwest portion of the state.5 Preliminary
estimates show that the Haynesville Shale may contain the
equivalent of “33 billion barrels of oil, or 18 years’ worth of current
U.S. oil production,” which had some members of the natural gas
industry claiming, “There’s no dry hole.”6
Chesapeake drilled its first exploratory well in the Haynesville
Shale by March 2006.7 When prices for natural gas were
skyrocketing, Chesapeake went public with its discovery of the
Haynesville Shale in 2008.8 Based on high prices, natural gas
companies began a “land-grab” that resulted in the execution of high
value leases.9 These companies offered highly favorable terms,
including extremely lucrative sign-up bonuses.10 However, an
unsettled economy soon eroded demand for natural gas.
Copyright 2014, by SAMUEL S. CRICHTON.
1. Ben Casselman, U.S. Gas Fields Go From Bust to Boom, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 30, 2009, at A1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Ross H. Pifer, What a Short, Strange Trip It’s Been: Moving
Forward After Five Years of Marcellus Shale Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REV.
615, 621 (2011).
5. Casselman, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Chesapeake Loses Bid to Void Texas Oil, Gas Rights
Award, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek.
com/news/2012-09-12/chesapeake-loses-bid-to-void-texas-oil-gas-rights-award#p1
[http://perma.cc/N722-L9S4] (archived March 3, 2014).
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Overproduction resulted in a “glut” that drove natural gas prices to
their lowest levels in six years and prompted companies to
significantly decrease drilling.11 Prices plummeted, and “[b]etween
July and October, oil and natural gas prices fell by more than 50%,
and kept falling.”12
Today, natural gas companies still face great difficulty in their
capacity to successfully and economically withdraw gas from deepshale formations. Some officials of the Energy Information Agency
are concerned that companies could be “set up for failure” and will
go bankrupt due to the unsustainably high prices that some paid to
landowners during the “land rush.”13
Companies such as Chesapeake are still litigating many of the
leases, or alleged leases, in states across the country. Many
landowners claim that Chesapeake formed agreements only to “walk
away” when the market crashed.14 To complicate matters, there is
significant tension between the decisions emerging in state and
federal courts in Louisiana and across the country. This tension
stems from questions as to the landowners’ possible remedies that
may be available under various causes of action, and in many cases,
whether there was even a contract at all.15 Even the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has weighed in and, applying Texas
law, held that an energy company’s promises and actions constituted
a viable basis for the formation of a contract.16

11. Casselman, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Ian Urbina, Behind Veneer, Doubt on Future of Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2011, at A1.
14. Fisk, supra note 10.
15. In Louisiana, see Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 635, 636
(W.D. La. 2011); ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, No. 11-CV-1343,
2012 WL 2357313 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-30717, 2013 WL
5977608 (5th Cir. June 20, 2012); Haire v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 09-1214, 2009
WL 4927875 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2009). For other jurisdictions, see Valentino v.
Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 09-1615, 2010 WL 2034550 (W.D. Pa. May
21, 2010); Hollingsworth v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:09CV838, 2009
WL 3601586 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009).
16. Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311, 322 (5th Cir. 2012)
(“Chesapeake claims the agreement lacked terms that would have been included in
the final Purchase and Sale Agreement, such as warranties of title, depth
limitations, non-compete provisions, and options to purchase additional acreage.
The July Agreement, however, did contain depth provisions. Furthermore,
Chesapeake identifies no authority for its claim that warranties of title, noncompete provisions and options to purchase additional acreage are essential
elements in a conveyance of oil and gas leases, rather than terms that the parties
could leave open for later negotiation. The July Agreement was sufficiently
definite to be enforced.”).
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Legislation has been considered, but not yet enacted, in an
attempt to curb the source of this litigation by stemming the tide of
unsolicited offers.17 Whether this legislation will be successful is
subject to debate, and its application, if passed, will be in the hands
of the courts. Regardless, litigation is pending, and this problem will
almost certainly arise again when market forces incentivize another
Louisiana “land-grab.” Well-developed jurisprudence would ensure
legal predictability for both the energy companies and landowners.
Across the country, as a result of the shale “land-grab,” three
general groups of landowners emerged. First, there were landowners
with viable contracts who were satisfied with the payment they
received during the “land-grab.” Accordingly, this group is not in
search of any remedy. Second, there were landowners who did not
know about the shale formation under their land and signed or
renewed leases without that knowledge. Third, there were
landowners who believed they had successfully entered into
contracts with favorable terms but were later told by company
officials that no such agreements existed.
Section II of this Comment discusses the causes of action that
were sought by the second group of landowners: those who did not
know about the mineral deposits but had contracts. Section III
examines the causes of action pursued by the third set of
landowners, who believed in, and relied on, the confidence of their
lucrative contracts. Section IV considers the impact of this litigation
and potential routes that remedies might take in the future.
II. RESCINDING CONTRACTS UNDER PRE-SHALE
DISCOVERY FRAUD CLAIMS
The second group of landowners consists of those who did not
know about the shale formation under their land, yet signed or
renewed leases. As a result of their lack of knowledge, they typically
granted lease terms favorable to energy companies (compared to
other contracts at the time). These landowners have brought suit and
have attempted to rescind these newly signed or renewed leases.
Landowners claim that energy companies had prior knowledge of
the formations, but failed to make that information available to the
landowners.18 Further, they argue that this lack of information
17. S.B. 530, 2012 Reg. Sess. (La. 2012).
18. In Louisiana, see HMB Interests, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Louisiana L.P.,
No. 08-1542, 2010 WL 3896521 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2010); Hayes v. Pride Oil &
Gas Props., Inc., No. 09-0488, 2010 WL 318273 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2010);
Thomas v. Pride Oil & Gas Props., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245 (W.D. La.
2009); Cascio v. Twin Cities Dev., LLC, 48 So. 3d 341 (La. Ct. App. 2010). In
other jurisdictions, see Pifer, supra note 4 (“In an attempt to take advantage of the
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created a sufficient error to justify rescission of their previous
agreements. However, these claims have been unsuccessful in both
federal and state court.19
The crux of these claims, particularly in Louisiana, is that error
existed on the part of the landowners as to the object of the mineral
lease.20 As a result of this supposed error, landowners claim that
their consent was vitiated.21 The plaintiff-landowners maintain that
they would never have entered into or renewed their contracts with
the energy companies had they known the value of the mineral
deposits under their land.22 They contend that this lack of
knowledge, particularly when the company knew of the existence of
the formations, constituted error that would vitiate consent under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1948, 1949, and 1950.23
However, these claims did not survive motions to dismiss in the
early stages of litigation because of “[t]he inherent nature and
character of the right to extract oil and gas from the soil . . . [which
is not] susceptible of having an intrinsic, determinable, and fixable
value.”24 The courts, when examining this claim, have analyzed the
nature of the energy business, which is inherently speculative and
unpredictable.25 Further, they examined comparable laws pertaining

higher lease market, many of these landowners with early leases filed legal actions
seeking to terminate their leases. In total, there were nearly one hundred lawsuits
filed in state and federal courts, putting the validity of thousands of leases at
issue.”).
19. Id.
20. HMB Interests, 2010 WL 3896521; Hayes, 2010 WL 318273 (W.D. La.
Jan. 22, 2010); Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 245; Cascio, 48 So. 3d 341.
21. See Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 343; see also HMB Interests, 2010 WL 3896521,
at *1.
22. See HMB Interests, 2010 WL 3896521, at *3.
23. See Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 343; see also HMB Interests, 2010 WL 3896521,
at *2 (“The consent of a contracting party may be vitiated by error, fraud, or
duress . . . . ‘[E]rror vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which
the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known or should
have been known to the other party.’ La. Civ. Code art. 1949. An ‘error concerns
cause’ when it ‘bears on the nature of the contract, or the thing that is the
contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing, or the person, or the
qualities of the other party, of the law, or any other circumstance that the parties
regarded, or should have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.’ La. Civ. Code art.
1950.”).
24. Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 343 (citing Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607, 609 (La.
1924)).
25. See Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
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to mineral rights, which served as further verification of their
analysis.26 Louisiana courts have consistently dismissed these suits.
A. Fraudulent Inducement Claims: Another Possible Remedy?
Plaintiff-landowners brought more viable claims of fraudulent
inducement under Louisiana Civil Code article 1953, with the
premise that the companies sought leases but did not disclose the
very lucrative shale discovery; further, landowners argued that their
consent was vitiated because energy companies suppressed the truth
in order to “obtain an unjust advantage” in the form of less
expensive leases.27 These claims are superior because of the nature
of the “land-grab” and the energy companies’ prior knowledge of
the shale formations, which the companies did not bring to the
public’s attention until after first signing or renewing leases for
cheaper rates.28
Louisiana Civil Code article 1953 states that “[f]raud is a
misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the
intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to
cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. Fraud may also result
from silence or inaction.”29 There are three basic elements to prove
fraudulent inducement under article 1953: “(1) a misrepresentation,
suppression, or omission of true information; (2) the intent to obtain
an unjust advantage or to cause damage or inconvenience to another;
and (3) the error induced by a fraudulent act must relate to a
circumstance substantially influencing the victim’s consent to (a
cause of) the contract.”30
The first question for courts is whether energy companies
misrepresented information when entering into negotiations with
landowners. The plaintiff may be able to win on this element in
some instances. For example, Chesapeake’s knowledge of the
Haynesville Shale was noted in 2006, and they were aware of its
viability and vast potential for profit in 2007.31 Chesapeake

26. Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 344 (“Because sales of mineral leases are not subject
to rescission on this basis under La. R.S. 31:17, it follows that a claim of error on
this basis cannot rescind the sale either. . . . [W]e find this contract may not be
rescinded for error.”).
27. In Louisiana, see Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 240. In other jurisdictions,
see Pifer, supra note 4, at 629.
28. Casselman, supra note 1.
29. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953 (2014).
30. Williams v. Interstate Dodge Inc., 34 So. 3d 1151, 1155–56 (La. Ct. App.
2010).
31. Casselman, supra note 1.
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executives were so confident that they even claimed that “we knew
that we had a tiger by the tail.”32
The second element that the plaintiffs need to prove is that the
companies intended to obtain an unjust advantage. This element
may also be quite easy for the plaintiffs to contend. While
companies did not want to announce the discovery of an unproven
and inaccessible source of natural gas, they also wanted to receive
favorable terms for tracts of land that were up for renewal or
suspected of containing lucrative shale deposits.33 It is fathomable
that energy companies did not disclose the Haynesville Shale’s
existence in order to not alert competitors and to get a head start in
the “land-grab.”
The third and final element is whether the error induced by the
companies influenced the decision of the landowners to sign the
lease. The landowners’ argument here may be compelling; in short,
they claim that they would not have signed the lease on the terms
offered had they known of the massive shale formation under their
land.
B. Courts Reject Un-nuanced Fraud Claims
Despite the appearance of an adequate fraudulent inducement
cause of action, Louisiana courts have rejected these claims because
of both the specific nature of the Louisiana Mineral Code and
because of holdings in previous Louisiana court decisions.
Primarily, these claims fall flat under the initial element. Louisiana
courts have recognized that no duty existed because “a mineral
lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor . . . .”34 To
sustain a claim under article 1953 that there was “fraud from silence
or suppression of the truth, there must exist a duty to speak or
disclose information.”35 Specifically, some courts have rebutted the
argument that energy companies knew of and concealed the
existence of the Haynesville Shale by stating that, even if true, the
plaintiff had not “reposed confidence in Defendant which resulted in
Defendant’s superiority and influence over Plaintiff;”36 this is
necessary to show the existence of a fiduciary duty.37 Finally, the
negotiation process did not impose a duty on the energy company or
32. Id.
33. Casselman, supra note 1. (“We knew we had the tiger by the tail”).
34. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 (2000).
35. Thomas v. Pride Oil & Gas Props., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241 (W.D.
La. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Greene v. Gulf Coast Bank,
593 So. 2d 630, 632 (La. 1992)).
36. Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 241.
37. Id.
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its agents because “an invitation to contract, without more, is
insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship or a duty to disclose
information concerning the value of the property.”38
C. Finding a Remedy by Showing Depth of Relationship to the
Lessee or Misleading Sstatements.
If the plaintiff could show that there was more depth to their
landowner-lessee relationship, such as a history of a business
relationship with a confidential element to it, then the plaintiff’s
action might survive a motion for summary judgment.39 In Emerson
v. Shirley, a mineral royalty owner, Emerson, sought to annul the
sale of his royalty to a former business partner, Noble, who
allegedly procured the royalty through a third party, Shirley.40
Emerson believed that Noble and Shirley had particular inside
knowledge that the royalty was substantially more valuable than the
sale price.41 Further, he claimed that, given the informal, oral
business arrangement that he and Noble previously had, Noble had a
fiduciary duty and thus was obligated to disclose the profitability of
the royalty.42
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that both the trial and
appellate court were incorrect in facially preventing Emerson’s
fraud claim, and that Emerson could attempt to establish that his
relationship with Noble had a confidential element.43 This
confidential element, if proven, would impose a duty on Noble for
broader disclosure.44 Joint ownership of a royalty interest alone does
not create a foundation for a confidential relationship, which might
entitle one of the parties to disclose the value of a royalty to the
other.45
Further, if the plaintiff could show that the misleading disclosure
was made about a property, then a remedy might be found. In
American Guaranty Co. v. Sunset Realty & Planting Co., an agent
for an energy company made representations to an out-of-state
company regarding tracts of land and the mineral values of each.46
38. Id.
39. See Emerson v. Shirley, 175 So. 909, 911–12 (La. 1937).
40. Id. at 910.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 911.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 911–12.
45. Id. at 911; see also Mims v. Hilliard, 125 So. 2d 205, 206–07 (La. Ct.
App. 1960).
46. Am. Guar. Co. v. Sunset Realty & Planting Co., 23 So. 2d 409, 412 (La.
1944).
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The land, which turned out to be a viable and high-producing field,
was sold to the defendant, Small, for substantially less than its true
worth.47 Plaintiff contended that Small made affirmative
representations that his pursuit of the field was purely speculative48
when, in fact, he possessed knowledge that the energy company had
a geophysical map of the area that showed connections to an oil
producing field of tremendous value.49 Plaintiffs argued that Small
suppressed this knowledge in order to obtain the property rights at a
relatively insignificant value.50
The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that, while parties are not
generally bound to make statements regarding the value of the
subject (such as the potential value of the land), if they make
statements, then they are obligated to disclose fully.51 The court held
as follows:
While a purchaser is under no obligation to inform a
prospective vendor as to the value, the title or the condition
of the property involved, he, individually, or as agent for his
principal, having made representations and statements as to
the value, the title or the condition of the property, knowing
them to be false or reckless or without knowledge of their
truth or falsity, is under the solemn obligation to make
correct representations and tell the whole truth, without
concealment or suppression of any material facts, especially
if there exists an inequality of knowledge, as where the seller
does not reside near the land and the purchaser does and is
familiar with it.52
This is true despite the invitation to investigate by the defendant,
Small. The invitation does not provide a carte blanche excuse for
the defendant’s actions.53 In particular, this is significant because the
Louisiana Supreme Court notes that it was not possible for the outof-state plaintiff to ascertain the value of the property; an expert
would have been required, and investigation would have been
difficult.54 That invitation to investigate, in conjunction with false
representations by Small, made the fraud in American Guaranty
more insidious.55
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 427.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 427.
Id.
See id. at 449.
Am. Guar. Co., 23 So. 2d at 449.
Id.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 452.
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In the present sets of cases under consideration, landowners’
ignorance of the existence of shale gas stems from the desire of
many energy companies to maintain confidentiality in the early
investigation of the shale,56 which is slightly suspect because by
2007, energy companies earnestly believed that their position was
not speculative.57 However, whether there was any disclosure that
might have misled the defendants is a fact-specific issue for the trial
court to discover. In American Guaranty, Small’s affirmative
representations regarding the land led the Louisiana Supreme Court
to conclude that Small had fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to
convey their mineral rights for substantially lower values. While no
duty originally existed, once Small made those affirmative
representations regarding the property, he assumed a duty to fully
and honestly correct his inaccurate representations and disclose the
whole truth.58
A case rendered by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
has also taken an interesting position that may offer a final refuge
for landowners who seek recourse for alleged fraudulent
inducement. In Mims v. Hilliard, plaintiffs sought cancellation of a
mineral lease on the basis that the contract was the product of fraud
and misrepresentation.59 The defendant and the plaintiff conducted
negotiations over a fifty-acre tract of land.60 Plaintiffs agreed to
lease the tract but then discovered that fourteen acres of the fiftyacre tract were placed in a compulsory unit.61 The defendant was
aware of the Conservation Commissioner’s actions and of the
intention to place part of the tract in a new unit62, but the defendant
used that position for his benefit. However, the appellate court
pointed out that, had the landowners simply inquired through public
records, they would have discovered that the Office of Conservation
formed the new unit.63 While the lack of a confidential relationship
between the parties made it clear that there was no affirmative duty
to disclose the information, the defendant would have been under an
obligation to disclose this material fact to the landowner if he was
56. Energy company secrecy could be justified from a policy or practical
standpoint. From a policy standpoint, requiring automatic full disclosure to
landowners would eliminate a significant market advantage for the company and
would not reward innovative “first-movers.” From a practical standpoint, it would
likely shift the costs of speculation entirely onto energy companies and could
prove fiscally unsustainable.
57. Casselman, supra note 1.
58. In other words, “Ask me no questions, I’ll tell you no lies.”
59. Mims v. Hilliard, 125 So. 2d 205 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
60. See id. at 206.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 206–07.
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asked.64 Thus, while a landowner may not have such a confidential
relationship with an energy company or its representative that
requires disclosure, if the landowner makes an inquiry to the
opponent party and the facts are misrepresented, a remedy is
available.
Louisiana courts have not been receptive to requests by
landowners to rescind existing contracts. Fraud and fraudulent
inducement claims that are based simply on the premise that the
landowners were not aware of the true value of their oil, natural gas,
and mineral reserves appear to be hardly sufficient to sustain
rescission of an existing contract. This is particularly important
given the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recognition that oil, natural
gas, and minerals do not have a readily available or fixable value
because the values are speculative.65 These contracts are, in large
part, speculation by companies who may or may not possess special
knowledge. Similarly, article 1953 claims will largely fail given that
there is no affirmative obligation on the part of the energy company
to disclose. However, remedies are available. First, if a landowner or
royalty owner can illustrate that the energy company or its
representative had a special relationship that gives rise to a duty,
then that duty might give rise to an obligation to disclose
information regarding, for example, the value or potential value of a
royalty. Second, if the company or its representative makes false or
misleading statements, they are obligated to correct those incorrect
or untrue claims. Third, and finally, it appears that the contract may
be rescinded if the landowner makes a specific inquiry and the
lessee made misrepresentations in response.
III. DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE: A VIABLE REMEDY FOR LANDOWNERS
While there were many landowners who knew that they had
lucrative contracts and were satisfied with the terms of those leases
or who signed below-market leases and attempted rescission, a third
set of landowners still remains. These landowners frequently
received offers from energy companies, or landmen working on
behalf of energy companies, who offered terms including profitable
above-market bonuses and royalties. Following the crash and the
pullback in activity, companies exercised various options to evade

64. Id. at 207 (“While this Court is of the opinion that defendant knew of the
formation of the unit at the time that he purchased the lease, in the absence of an
inquiry by plaintiffs he was under no obligation to divulge same to them.”).
65. See Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607, 609 (La. 1924).
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contractual obligations. Such options included failure to close,66
failure to obtain management approval,67 and the failure to include
lessee signature despite the presence of lessor signature.68 These
practices have led to seemingly inconsistent decisions in federal and
state courts across the country. The initial question is whether these
practices are legitimate, and, if so, whether the landowner can still
seek remedy by arguing detrimental reliance.
A. The Requirement of a Writing and Some Manifestation of Intent
by the Non-Signatory Party
A conflict exists in many of the courts across the country as to
the legitimacy of evasive tactics such as management approval
clauses. While the specifics of practices like these vary from
company to company, the general concept remains the same. An
energy company approaches a landowner and offers lucrative,
above-market bonuses and royalties to incentivize the landowner to
sign. The landowner then signs and returns the lease. The lessee then
takes the contract, which had a condition that required management
approval prior to execution, and “sits” on the contract for a specified
period of time. After the market crash, these contracts, which were
generally not signed by the lessee, were returned to the landowners
with a statement that they would not be entering into a lease with the
landowners.69 While the specific determination of whether these
practices are legitimate is a precise and fact-specific question left
best to the discretion of trial courts, Louisiana law provides a
general remedy against this practice.
Under article 1839 of the Louisiana Civil Code, “[a] transfer of
immovable property must be made by authentic act or by act under
66. See Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2012);
see also Shafer v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-1142, 2011 WL
677479 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2011); Valentino v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No.
09-1615, 2010 WL 2034550 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2010); Hollingsworth v. Range
Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:09CV838, 2009 WL 3601586 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28,
2009).
67. Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. La. 2011).
68. ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, 11-CV-1343, 2012 WL
2357313, at *2 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-30717, 2013 WL 5977608
(5th Cir. June 20, 2012).
69. For Louisiana, see generally Ballard, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 636–37; Haire v.
XTO Energy Inc., No. 09-1214, 2009 WL 4927875 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2009). For
other states, see generally Shafer v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 2:10-CV1142, 2011 WL 677479 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2011); Valentino v. Range Res.Appalachia, LLC, No. 09-1615, 2010 WL 2034550 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2010);
Hollingsworth v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:09CV838, 2009 WL
3601586 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009).
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private signature.”70 Pursuant to article 1947, when no legal
requirement is present and “the parties have contemplated a certain
form, it is presumed that they do not intend to be bound until the
contract is executed in that form.”71 The other end of this
presumption is that, “unless the parties have contemplated
otherwise, the contract need not be in a certain form.”72
In addition, mineral leases cannot be concluded in an oral
agreement; they must be written.73 These “management clauses” and
other practices can be examined in light of these code articles and
corresponding Louisiana jurisprudence. In instances where the
energy company would receive the signature of the lessor but would
not sign the document, the question initially became whether the
company manifested the intent to be bound despite the presence of
the “management clause.”
A Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision addressed
whether a mineral lease must be signed by both parties. In Bills v.
Fruge, a mineral lease was mailed to Fruge (a prisoner) with a
money draft attached to it.74 Bills instructed Fruge to sign the lease,
notarize it, and then return it.75 Fruge endorsed the draft, but the
lease was not returned.76 The trial court held that, despite the fact
that the mineral lease was not signed, a contract existed because
Fruge cashed the draft.77 The Third Circuit reversed, stating that
mineral leases must be in writing.78 In making this assessment, the
court stated that jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Mineral
Code consistently required mineral leases to have the “same written
testimonial proof as transfers of immovable property.”79 Further, the
Third Circuit indicated that scholars agreed that a written element
was necessary.80 As a result, even though Fruge had signed the draft
and cashed it, a written mineral lease signed by the lessor was still
required.81
70. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1839 (2014).
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1947 (2014).
72. Patrick S. Ottinger, Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 60 LA. L.
REV. 765, 767 (2000).
73. See ASJ Interests, 2012 WL 2357313, at *4; see also Ballard, 784 F.
Supp. 2d at 638.
74. Bills v. Fruge, 360 So. 2d 661, 662 (La. Ct. App. 1978), writ denied, 362
So. 2d 792 (La. 1978).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 662–63.
78. Id. at 663.
79. Id.
80. See Bills, 360 So. 2d at 663.
81. Id.
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However, it is also clear from Louisiana case law that both
parties do not need to sign the written mineral lease.82 In another
case rendered by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, St. Romain v.
Midas Exploration, Inc., St. Romain, a landowner, was contacted by
Midas regarding a mineral lease, and after negotiations, an
agreement was reached.83 Midas and its agent, French, prepared the
mineral lease and also a bank draft for St. Romain.84 He and the
other landowners signed the mineral lease and endorsed the bank
draft, which was then picked up by French; however, after 30 days,
the company did not pay the draft.85 The defendant asserted that the
bonus payment was conditioned upon the company accepting the
lease.86 Midas contended that, since Midas did not sign the lease, the
company did not accept.87 The court found that a contract did exist
because the company contacted the landowner, made the final offer,
and prepared the lease, which manifested its consent to be bound.88
The appellate court held that, although mineral leases must be in
writing, it is not necessary that the lessee sign the written
instrument; rather, the company merely must indicate its consent to
the lease agreement.89 Since Midas prepared a bank draft and
conducted serious negotiations, the court found that the lessee’s
consent was present.90 Despite the absence of the lessee’s signature,
the court found that the signature of the landowner and the
manifestation of Midas’s intent were sufficient to support the
existence of a binding contract.91
This is particularly true if the energy company has prepared the
lease agreement and presented it to the landowner for the
landowner’s signature. The Louisiana Supreme Court made this
82. See Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643, 648 (E.D. La.
1966), aff'd, 387 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1968) (“The oil, gas and mineral lease held by
Pennington on the 2,425 acres of land was not a valid lease when executed by the
purported lessor, Mills, because of the fact that it was never signed by Pennington.
But a lease may be accepted by the lessee and thus become an effective lease by
means other than being signed by the lessee. In this case, the lease as between
Pennington and Mills did become an effective lease because Pennington, by
making lease payments, and by asserting his ownership of the lease signified his
acceptance thereof, and because the lessor Mills, in accepting rental payments
from Pennington, is estopped to deny the validity of the lease.”) (emphasis added).
83. St. Romain v. Midas Exploration, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (La. Ct.
App. 1983).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1356.
87. Id. at 1355–56.
88. Id. at 1356.
89. See id. at 1357.
90. See St. Romain, 430 So. 2d at 1357.
91. See id. at 1357–58.
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conclusion in Rainey v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., where a
contractor’s employee was injured while working at an Entergy
site.92 The court considered the validity of a written contract
between Entergy and the contractor that was previously prepared.93
The contractor had signed the agreement, but Entergy had not.94 The
Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “It has long been held by our
courts that a party who prepares the contract and presents it to the
other party for their signature may not later claim he is not bound by
the contract because his signature is lacking.”95 These decisions
form a powerful presumption that a contract is formed when the
energy company drafts a lease agreement, receives a signature from
the landowner, and then provides some manifestation that a contract
exists.
Likewise, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, when
applying Texas law, came to a similar conclusion by stating that a
Chesapeake management approval clause did not preclude the
formation of a contract:
That the Agreement provided Chesapeake would have an
opportunity to examine title to the leases and to review any
contracts and agreements affecting the leases and lands
covered by the leases, and that these needed to be
“reasonably acceptable” to Chesapeake, also does not render
the agreement indefinite. Texas courts have explained that
an agreement subject to one party’s approval is not indefinite
if it includes an objective standard—such as “reasonable”—
on which that approval must be based. . . . Thus, the
inclusion of this clause in the agreement did not render it
indefinite.96
It would seem that, despite a failure to close or the presence of a
management approval requirement, many landowners may have
viable contracts if they were presented with a lease drafted by the
mineral company, and they signed and returned it. Yet, many federal
and state courts have stressed an additional requirement, namely,
that some external manifestation of intent on the part of the
landowner or the company is essential.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
2012).

Rainey v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 35 So. 3d 215, 217 (La. 2010).
See id. at 218.
See id. at 217–18.
Id. at 227.
Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311, 322 n.36 (5th Cir.
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1. Despite External Manifestations of Acceptance, If the
Landowner Prepares the Original, then Landowner’s Signature
Alone is Insufficient for Formation
St. Romain and Rainey considered documents prepared by the
company and signed by other parties; both cases also involved some
external action demonstrating that the company desired to be bound
by the contract.97 Some federal courts in Louisiana have stressed
that a partially signed written lease is not sufficient if it is also
lacking some manifestation of intent on the part of the company. In
ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, Chesapeake made an
oral offer to ASJ, which was accepted.98 Following oral acceptance,
the offer was reduced to writing and signed by almost all of the
relevant landowners before Chesapeake notified its representative
that they would not follow through with the agreement.99 ASJ
argued that Chesapeake was bound when the plaintiffs accepted
Chesapeake’s offer and when it was put into writing, regardless of
whether Chesapeake signed the lease.100
The court found that a valid lease was not formed because
Chesapeake had not signed it, set up a closing date, or delivered the
bonus check.101 The court noted that the proposed lease was
modeled from a lease used in a previous interaction by ASJ.102 In a
previous agreement over an entirely separate tract (Tract 34), the
two parties had used a lease developed by ASJ.103 Following
completion of that agreement, the representative for Chesapeake
took the lease for that first separate tract (Tract 34) and updated it
for use in the present case (Tract 33).104 The representative offered
the exact same terms to ASJ, and all the relevant landowners orally
agreed.105
The district court emphasized evidence revealing that
Chesapeake agreed to the terms, including that it prepared the lease,
delivered the lease to ASJ, had previous negotiations that were
successful with similar terms, and prepared checks, some of which
97. See Rainey, 35 So. 3d 215; St. Romain v. Midas Exploration, Inc., 430 So.
2d 1354 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
98. ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, No. 11-CV-1343, 2012 WL
2357313, at *1 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-30717, 2013 WL 5977608
(5th Cir. June 20, 2012).
99. Id. at *1.
100. Id. at *3.
101. See id. at *6–7.
102. Id. at *6.
103. Id. at *2.
104. ASJ Interests, 2012 WL 2357313, at *2.
105. Id.
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were mailed.106 The court stated that the presumption established in
St. Romain and Rainey was not controlling since ASJ originally
prepared the other lease in the first agreement:
The Court is mindful that the party who prepares a contract
and presents it to the other party for their signature cannot
claim not to be bound by the contract because his signature
is lacking. However, in the instant case, that principle is
tempered by the fact that Madison drafted the lease
agreement for Section 34. . . . More importantly, it was
Madison who unilaterally added to the lease agreement a
signature block for Chesapeake to sign. This signature block
did not appear on any of Chesapeake’s lease forms, but
rather was intentionally added to the Plaintiffs’ lease
agreement by Madison himself. This act demonstrates that
Madison, as the Plaintiffs’ representative, contemplated
obtaining Chesapeake’s signature.107
As a result of a failure to invoke the St. Romain and Rainey
presumption, the federal district court concluded that—even though
the parties might have had a meeting of the minds—a closing was
essential to establish a binding obligation on Chesapeake.108
Distinguishing St. Romain and Rainey, the federal court stated that,
in this case, the lease was not complete until Chesapeake signed the
agreement because Chesapeake did not manifest its consent by
tendering payments, accepting the executed lease documents, or
signing the lease when a signature block was intentionally added by
the plaintiff.109
While decisions similar to this may seem to narrow the
presumption of St. Romain and Rainey, the change is merely one of
appearance rather than substance. The question of which party
created the contract is a fact-specific issue that requires examination
by the trial court; however, the important part of the decision—
whether intent is objectively manifested—is largely consistent with
St. Romain and Rainey. Distinguishing the Louisiana Third Circuit
decision in St. Romain from the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision
in Rainey, the federal district court stated that the parties did not
intend to be bound until closing and that no manifestation of intent
existed because payments were not tendered and lease documents
were not accepted.110
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at *6.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See ASJ Interests, 2012 WL 2357313, at *6.
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Other recent federal district court decisions involving the
Haynesville Shale similarly apply Louisiana law. For example, in
Haire v. XTO Energy Inc., plaintiffs solicited an offer from the
defendant to lease mineral rights with an attached lease form.111 The
defendant authorized its agent to make an oral offer, which was
accepted.112 The defendant’s agent then sent correspondence
claiming that the representative had “gotten” the plaintiff’s tract.113
However, they did not honor the agreement, and the plaintiff
brought suit.114 The federal district court stated that there was no
sign that the defendant manifested its consent; specifically, no
serious negotiations between the parties had taken place, the
company did not pay any drafts, and there were no other signs that
the company desired to be bound.115
While the form and signature of the lease were not at issue, the
federal court, consistent with ASJ Interests, required an explicit and
affirmative showing of some manifestation of intent.116 It now
appears clear that, if a signature is not present, a landowner must
seek out some affirmative act on the part of the lessee that
demonstrates intent, such as the tendering of a bank draft,117 serious
negotiations,118 or accepting the “executed lease documents.”119
2. E-mail Probably Satisfies the Requirement that a Mineral
Lease be in Writing
Another related question is whether an e-mail exchange satisfies
the requirement that a mineral lease be in writing. This area of law is
almost certain to see more development, particularly given
technological advances and Louisiana’s requirement that mineral
leases must be written.120 In another federal district court decision
concerning the Haynesville Shale and the manifestation of a
company’s intent, Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., this question was
111. Haire v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 09-1214, 2009 WL 4927875, at *1 (W.D.
La. Dec. 18, 2009).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *2.
116. See id.
117. See St. Romain v. Midas Exploration, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1354, 1357 (La. Ct.
App. 1983).
118. See id.
119. ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, No. 11-CV-1343, 2012 WL
2357313, at *6 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-30717, 2013 WL 5977608
(5th Cir. June 20, 2012).
120. Id. at *2; see also Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638
(W.D. La. 2011).
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addressed, albeit loosely.121 The district court stated that, though
there was certainly a writing requirement, the specific “source and
scope” of the writing requirement was unclear.122 That court
declined to examine the issue because, even if it had constituted a
valid mineral lease, it did not contain the other requirements;
specifically, it did not evince offer and acceptance and did not
preclude consummation by other means.123 As a result, no contract
was formed.124
However, the Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
clearly resolves this issue; it states that “[a] record or signature may
not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in
electronic form.”125 Similarly, the “contract may not be denied legal
effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used
in its formation.”126 The writing requirement has also been
specifically satisfied because the Act states, “If a law requires a
record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.”127
Finally, “[i]f a law requires a signature, an electronic signature
satisfies the law.”128 The Fifth Circuit, when applying this Act,
stated that there must be a showing of intent.129 This clearly resolves
the “source and scope” concern articulated by the lower federal
court.
B. Even if these evasive tactics are legitimate, Louisiana landowners
should be able to find a cause of action under detrimental reliance.
1. Landowners’ Situations Often Satisfy the Elements of
Detrimental Reliance
Even if courts are willing to legitimize the evasive tactics used
by energy companies to resist contracts following the shale boomand-bust, landowners should still find a remedy under Louisiana
Civil Code article 1967. Article 1967 establishes the principles of
detrimental reliance:
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.

121. See generally Ballard, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
122. Id. at 638.
123. Id. at 639.
124. Id.
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2607(A) (2005).
126. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2607(B).
127. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2607(C).
128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2607(D).
129. See Regions Bank v. Cabinet Works, L.L.C., 92 So. 3d 945, 956 (La. Ct.
App. 2012).
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A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or
should have known that the promise would induce the other
party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was
reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the
expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the
promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous
promise made without required formalities is not
reasonable.130
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that, in order to prove
detrimental reliance, “a party must prove three elements by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) a representation by conduct or
word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one’s
detriment because of the reliance.”131 Interestingly, Louisiana Civil
Code article 1967 and Louisiana jurisprudence do not require “a
formal, valid, and enforceable contract.”132 As a result, it is
inconsequential whether landowners can show the existence of a
contract. Landowners need only show a representation, justifiable
reliance as a result of that representation, and a change in position
that caused a detriment. The Supreme Court stated that the purpose
of detrimental reliance is to “prevent injustice by barring a party
from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions,
representations, or silence.”133
While detrimental reliance has a very long jurisprudential
history in Louisiana, its application by Louisiana courts has been
inconsistent.134 There are different explanations for its uneven
application. Some contend that judges do not universally agree on
this doctrine’s application.135 Others argue against its importation
into Louisiana law because it is considered a foreign import.136
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish
Consolidated Government outlined the concept of detrimental
reliance.137 In Suire, the plaintiff owned a house and some land
130. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1967 (2014).
131. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 59 (La.
2005).
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Babkow v. Morris Bart, P.L.C., 726 So. 2d 423, 427 (La. Ct.
App. 1998) (quoting Orr v. Bancroft Bag, Inc., 687 So. 2d 1068, 1070 (La. Ct.
App. 1997))).
134. See Shael Herman, Detrimental Reliance in Louisiana Law--Past,
Present, and Future (?): The Code Drafter's Perspective, 58 TUL. L. REV. 707,
715–16 (1984).
135. Id. at 715.
136. See Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 635, 641 n.2 (W.D. La.
2011); see also Herman, supra note 125, at 715–16.
137. See generally Suire, 907 So. 2d 37.
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through which a channel passed—the Belle Terre Coulee.138 The
city received a permit and attempted to improve the drainage of the
channel.139 Plaintiff claimed that representatives of the assorted
contractors had assured him that any damages incurred would be
remedied.140 Later, the plaintiff noticed damage to his property.141
The city argued that the detrimental reliance claim failed because
there was no contract.142 However, the court astutely indicated that
detrimental reliance is not based on the existence of contract
because it is not tied to the party’s intent to be bound.143 More
precisely, the court upheld the reversal of the trial court’s motion for
summary judgment and stated that whether a representation was
made and whether it was reasonable was an issue of material fact
that needed to be examined.144
However, in contrast, the federal district court in Ballard v. XTO
Energy Inc. granted a motion for summary judgment in response to
a claim of detrimental reliance.145 In Ballard, a landowner who
received numerous offers to lease his land opted instead to join a
pool of landowners to solicit an offer from XTO Energy.146 Typical
of many of the scenarios discussed previously, serious negotiations
were conducted, an agreement was tentatively reached, and XTO’s
agent informed the landowners that management approval was
required after the alleged offer.147 Soon after, plaintiffs were
informed that management approval was denied and that there was
no agreement.148
Ballard is the only case that discusses detrimental reliance in the
context of the Haynesville Shale and the evasive tactics used by
energy companies following the market dip in Louisiana. In Ballard,
the plaintiff alleged that he acted in reliance on XTO’s offer, and as
a result, he rejected numerous other lucrative offers.149 This formed
the crux of his detrimental reliance claim because he relied on the
existence of XTO’s offer and, when XTO withdrew, other
competitive offers were also withdrawn because of market
conditions.150 The plaintiff was able to substantially support with
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Suire, 907 So. 2d at 59.
Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 635, 641 (W.D. La. 2011).
Id. at 636.
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id. at 641.
Id.
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“ample evidence and plausibility” that he rejected other offers
because he relied on XTO’s offer and that financial harm
followed.151 However, the federal district court stated that
detrimental reliance was only viable if the plaintiff’s reliance on the
promises of XTO was reasonable, and in this case, it was not.152 The
standard applied was whether the “plaintiff reasonably knew or
should have known that [the] Defendant would not be bound until
the additional proposed terms were acknowledged and a written
contract was consummated.”153 Further, the court noted an odd
backdrop for their decision: detrimental reliance is “relatively
disfavored” in Louisiana due to its common law roots.154
Ballard illustrates the dilemma of landowners who believed that
they were parties to a valid contract and relied on that belief in either
rejecting offers from competing firms or not actively seeking out
bids on their land. There certainly was reliance, and there certainly
was financial damage caused by that reliance. The question then
becomes whether, in many of the Louisiana shale cases, there was a
“reasonable reliance.”155 Ballard can be distinguished from
previously discussed shale cases because the ultimate issue in
Ballard is that the plaintiff never accepted the offer from XTO, and
because they knowingly never accepted the contract, they could not
reasonably rely on the assumption that there was a contract.156
In the previous cases, however, plaintiffs reasonably believed in
earnest that a contract had been achieved. In ASJ Interests, there was
verbal acceptance of Chesapeake’s offer, which even the trial court
explicitly recognized as creating “no dispute that Chesapeake had
extended an oral offer to the Plaintiffs to lease land owned by them,
which offer had been accepted by the Plaintiffs.”157 The
representative for Chesapeake also said that there were checks for the
plaintiff, which appears to be an implicit recognition that there was a
concluded agreement.158 The representative even remarked to his
superior that he believed that there was an agreement and that he
“hope[d] this is just a minor delay, because these deals were made
and accepted. . . .”159 In this case, the language of the correspondence
151. Ballard, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
152. Id. at 641.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 641 n.2.
155. Id. at 641.
156. Id.
157. ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, No. 11-CV-1343, 2012 WL
2357313, at *1 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-30717, 2013 WL 5977608
(5th Cir. June 20, 2012).
158. See id. at *1–2.
159. Id. at *2.
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is a strong indicator that an agreement was concluded and that
simple, non-essential formalities remained so that ASJ Interests
would seem reasonable in relying on what the landowners believed
was a valid agreement. Likewise, in Haire, a representative made an
oral offer that was accepted by the plaintiffs.160
While a mineral lease requires a written form, detrimental
reliance does not. Detrimental reliance requires, as one of its three
elements, only “a representation by conduct or word.”161 The
language of the correspondent, the language of the representatives,
and other conduct creates a scenario on which a landowner, who is
not versed in the law, might reasonably rely. As a result, even
though there may not be a valid mineral lease because of defects in
the negotiation or the fact that it was not reduced to a written
contract accompanied by manifested intent, it appears clear that a
landowner may still have a remedy under Louisiana Civil Code
article 1967.162
2. Management Clauses: No Refuge from Detrimental Reliance
Claims
Ballard could be interpreted as a defense against detrimental
reliance on the grounds that the existence of a management approval
clause should cause landowners to not reasonably rely on
agreements until final approval is obtained. However, if
representations have been made that a deal is complete and mere
formalities remain, or the presence of an oral agreement would seem
to cause the landowner to reasonably presume the existence of an
agreement, then landowners satisfy the reasonable reliance
requirement. One case in particular that examines a management
approval condition is Duckett v. Grambling State University, which
contains many similarities to the shale cases.163
In Duckett, an assistant college basketball coach in South
Carolina left a higher paying job to move to Louisiana to coach for
160. Haire v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 09-1214, 2009 WL 4927875, at *1 (W.D.
La. Dec. 18, 2009).
161. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 59 (La.
2005).
162. Another relevant defense arises when considering that mineral contracts
must be reduced to writing. Is it possible for a lawyer, or an experienced landman,
to use detrimental reliance when the only foundation for their reasonable reliance
is the existence of an oral agreement? It seems possible to argue that, since they
are aware of the written requirement for mineral agreements that they are
incapable of reasonably relying on oral promises given the essential nature of the
written requirement. This issue, however, is outside of the scope of this Comment.
163. Duckett v. Grambling State Univ., 92 So. 3d 478 (La. Ct. App. 2012), writ
denied, 99 So. 3d 32 (2012).
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Grambling on the assurance that he would receive a four-year
contract.164 A promise was extended to Duckett, but it was subject to
management approval as required by Louisiana law.165 Duckett took
the job and worked for over a year, but he was fired because his
contract was not considered and taken up by the board.166 Duckett
claims that multiple representatives made assurances and, as a result,
he quickly signed his contract and sent it to Grambling.167
Grambling had his signed contract but he did not worry about it
further until he later received a termination letter.168 The trial court
stated that, while he had reasonably relied on the decision, the
existence of a management approval clause (formal acceptable by a
higher school authority) prohibited him from being able to
reasonably rely on presumed existence of a contract because he
knew that it was a prerequisite.169 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, however, stating that there were material issues of
fact that would require a trial on the merits.170
Duckett indicates that at least some Louisiana courts would
resist the argument that the management approval requirement in
shale cases operates as an automatic bar for detrimental reliance
claims. Presumably, this would allow landowners to reasonably rely
on the existence of agreements despite the presence of such a clause.
If landowners can show a reasonable reliance on representations of
the company-lessee, they may be able to find a remedy under
detrimental reliance.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the shale bust and the energy company “landgrab,” many landowners are left with mixed consequences. Some
landowners possess undervalued contracts, relative to the potential
value of the land. Landowners’ claims of fraud or fraudulent
inducement by energy companies and their representatives have
fallen—and will continue to fall—on deaf ears in Louisiana courts.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated rather explicitly that
extraction of oil, natural gas, and mineral deposits are an inherently
speculative activity with no fixed value.171 The Louisiana courts
have stated that Louisiana law does not establish a duty on the part
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 479.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 480.
See id. at 481.
Duckett, 92 So. 3d at 481–82.
Id. at 486.
See Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607, 609 (La. 1924).
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of the energy company to disclose the value of those resources.
Further, it appears that in the absence of a misrepresentation by the
energy company, there will not be a duty to disclose.
Landowners who relied on the belief that they had a viable
contract, but later found out that the company was attempting to
back out of their agreement, also face significant hurdles, but some
options are available. If the agreements have been reduced to writing
and include the lessor’s signature, there might be a remedy if the
energy company has manifested its intent to be bound by the
agreement. Regardless, even if no contract exists, there is a viable
and under-utilized area of Louisiana law that offers a remedy for
these beleaguered landowners: detrimental reliance. If landowners
can show that they reasonably relied on representations of the
energy company and its agents that resulted in a detriment, then,
even in the absence of a written agreement, landowners can receive
the compensation they desire and deserve.
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